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Abstract
This paper re-examines precautionary saving with general Selden/Kreps-Porteus prefer-
ences. The conditions existing in the literature are much more complex than in the Expected
Utility framework. We obtain a simple and intuitive result on precautionary savings via dis-
entangling time preference and risk preference eects.
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1 Introduction
It is well-known that current savings may be raised by the uncertainty of future incomes. This
motive for saving is called \precautionary saving". The precautionary saving problem is rst
studied by Leland (1968), Sandmo (1970) and Dreze and Modigliani (1972). Under the frame-
work of Expected-Utility (EU), Kimball (1990) introduces the terminology of prudence: an
agent is prudent if the uncertainty aects future incomes raises a motive for current saving. He
also shows that an agent is prudent if and only if she has a convex marginal utility of future
consumption. In the framework of EU, there is now a wide and lively literature on this line of
study.
Kimball and Weil (1992, 2009) point out that the traditional EU theory of precautionary
saving dose not disentangle aversion to risk and resistance to intertemporal substitution, because
it is built on intertemporal EU maximization. Therefore, it cannot address some fundamental
problems of consumption under labor income risk. For instance, given the same intertempo-
ral substitution, how do risk aversion changes aect the intensity of the precautionary saving
motive? They use a two-period model with Selden/Kreps-Porteus preferences to investigate
whether the results from an intertemporal EU framework continue to hold when we disentangle
aversion to risk and aversion to intertemporal substitution. Their answer is positive but under
a restriction: a decreasing marginal utility of saving (DMUS). Gollier (2001, p300-303) provides
a similar study on the motive for precautionary saving. K-W-G1 provide two sucient condi-
tions for DMUS: (i) the resistance to intertemporal substitution is greater than risk aversion, or
(ii) the certainty equivalent function of future consumption is concave. They show that a risk
preference with concave absolute risk tolerance guarantees condition (ii). These two conditions
limit the conditions leading to precautionary saving. Because there are many preferences that
violate condition (i), and \there is no obvious argument favoring the concavity or the convex-
ity of absolute risk tolerance (Gollier 2001, p165-166)," therefore it is better to dispense the
constraint on DMUS.
K-W-G model focuses on additive Selden/Kreps-Porteus preferences. Such preferences as-
sume that the subject discount factor (or marginal impatience) is independent of current wealth.
However this assumption is inconsistent with our intuition. Therefore, it is better to study pre-
cautionary saving in a general Selden/Kreps-Porteus preferences framework.
1Kimball and Weil (1992, 2009) and Gollier (2001) is abbreviated as \K-W-G".
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We notice that K-W-G's studies are based on Implicit Function Theorem. So they have
to impose the assumption of DMUS to assure concavity of the value function. In this paper,
we re-investigate K-W-G's precautionary saving model without the assumption of DMUS. We
show that supermodularity of value function provides a more general analysis for precautionary
saving.
We rst disentangle time preference and risk preference eects on the optimal level of saving
with general Selden/Kreps-Porteus preferences and show that the assumption of DMUS in Kim-
ball and Weil (1992, 2009)'s study is redundant. The result extends Gollier (2001, Proposition 78
part 2)'s conclusion. Then we study, given the same time aggregator, how risk aversion changes
aect the intensity of the precautionary saving motive. It can be shown that some results of
Kimball and Weil (2009)'s comparative statics are independent of DMUS. Therefore, our results
increase our knowledge of precautionary saving.
2 Prudence
Following the idea of K-W-G, we consider the precautionary saving with general Selden/Kreps-
Porteus preferences, which can be described as
max
s
V (s; ~x) =W (w0   s;M(s; ~x)); (1)
where w0 is the initial wealth in the rst period, s is the saving and W is the time aggregator.
M(s; ~x) is implicitly dened by v(M(s; ~x)) = Ev(w1+~x+s) where ~x is a risk such that E~x = 0,
w1 is the wealth the agent receives in the second period and  is the risk-free interest rate. We
assume v is an increasing and concave function. The concavity of v measures the degree of risk
aversion, while the properties of W are related to intertemporal substitution. The axiomatic
foundations of model (1) were examined by Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Selden (1978).
When W (x; y) = u(x) + U(y),
W (w0   s;M(s; ~x)) = u(w0   s) + U(M(s; ~x)): (2)
We are back to K-W-G model.
Let maxs V (s; 0) = W (w0   s;M(s; 0)) denote the optimal saving problem without the risk
~x (i.e., ~x  0) and maxs V (s; ~x) =W (w0  s;M(s; ~x)) denote the optimal problem with the risk
~x. Dene s1 2 argmaxV (s; 0) and s2 2 argmaxV (s; ~x).
Following K-W-G, we link prudence with precautionary saving in the following denition.
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Denition 2.1 Suppose that the agents have general Selden/Kreps-Porteus preferences de-
scribed by (1). An agent is prudent if s1  s2.
The following proposition provides a set of sucient conditions for precautionary saving.
Proposition 2.2 If W12  0, W22  0 and v is strictly Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion
(DARA), then the agent is prudent, that is, s1  s2.
Proof See Appendix. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2.2 disentangles the set of sucient conditions for precautionary saving into the
following two classes:
(i) time preference conditions: W12  0 and W22  0.
(ii) risk preference condition: strictly DARA.
W2 is dened as the subject discount factor (see, Koopmans, 1960). Hence W12  0 means
decreasing marginal impatience (DMI). The validity of DMI is supported by Lawrance (1991),
Samwick (1998), Harrison et al. (2002) and Ikeda (2006). W22  0 means the DM has preferences
for a late resolution of uncertainty (PLRU) (Kreps and Porteus 1978). A DM is PLRU if she
prefers to observe ~x at the second period than at the rst period. The PLRU is supported
by many empirical studies (e.g., Chew and Ho, 1994; Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1996; Lovallo and
Kahneman, 2000; Eliaz and Schotter, 2007; von Gaudecker, van Soest, and Wengstrom, 2011).
Proposition 2.2 concludes that DMI, PLRU and strictly DARA are the traits for prudence
in the framework of general Selden/Kreps-Porteus preferences. This disentangling of risk and
time preferences provides an important intuition about the property of precautionary saving.
When W (x; y) = u(x)+U(y), W12 = 0 and W22 = U
00. Proposition 2.2 implies the following
result:
Proposition 2.3 If U 00  0 and v is strictly DARA, then the agent is prudent, that is, s1  s2.
For W (x; y) = u(x)+U(y), Gollier (2001, Proposition 78) proposes the following result: assume
that M is concave in s, then s1  s2 if (i) v000  0 and U is more concave than v; or (ii) v
is DARA. Kimball and Weil (1992, 2009) use the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of
saving (e.g., U 0(M(s; ~x))Ms(s; ~x) is decreasing in s) to guarantee that s1  s2. They provide
two sucient conditions for the assumption: (i) U is more concave than v, or (ii) M is concave.
They show that a risk preference with concave absolute risk tolerance guarantees concavity of
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M . They also point out that, only for v with concave absolute risk tolerance, M is always
concave. Proposition 2.3 indicates that this constraint on decreasing marginal utility of saving
is not necessary. Therefore, our results enlarge the precautionary saving behavior.
In the proof of Proposition 2.2, we use the supermodularity property of the value function,
while K-W-G use the Implicit Function Theorem to obtain their results. The assumption of
concavity of the value function is a key to Implicit Function Theorem. For the value function
dened by (2), decreasing marginal utility of saving is equivalent to the concavity of the value
function. However, there are no concavity assumptions needed for supermodularity property
(see e.g., Sundaram 1996, p253, or Amir 2005, p639-640). This is the reason why Proposition
2.2 provides a more useful result.
We also notice that, in K-W-G, the utility function u of the rst period must be concave, so as
to assure that the the solution of optimal saving is uniquely determined2. But our work doesn't
need this strict assumption, that is, u can be non-concave. Especially, Crainich, Eeckhoudt and
Trannoy (2013) show that one risk seeking agent can own positive precautionary saving. Thus,
we cannot ignore the saving behavior of risk seeking agents. From this point, our approach has
a wider application.
3 Changes in risk aversion
In this section, given the same time aggregator, we link the aversion to risk to the intensity of
the precautionary saving motive. Consider
max
s
Vi(s; ~x) =W (w0   s;Mi(s; ~x)); for i = 1; 2; (3)
where Mi(s; ~x) is dened by vi(Mi(s; ~x)) = Evi(w1 + ~x+ s).
Dene si 2 argmaxVi(s; ~x) =W (w0 s;Mi(s; ~x)) for i = 1; 2. We propose the following two
propositions.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose two Selden/Kreps-Porteus utility functions share the same time ag-
gregator W but have dierent inner interpossibility functions v1 and v2, if
2Noting equation (8) in Kimball and weil (2009), if the rst-period utility function (i.e. u) is not global concave,
then decreasing marginal utility of saving still can't assure that the the solution of (8) is uniquely determined.
But the work of Kimball and Weil (2009) is conducted under the assumption of the unique solution, thus, their
work must assume both u00 < 0 and decreasing marginal utility of saving.
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(i) W12  0,
(ii)  W22W2   
v001
v01
,
(iii) v2 is more risk averse than v1,
(iv) v02 is more risk averse than v01,
(v) v2 has decreasing absolute risk aversion, and
(vi) at least one condition in (ii) to (v) holds strictly,
then s1  s2.
Proof See Appendix. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose two Selden/Kreps-Porteus utility functions share the same time ag-
gregator W but have dierent inner interpossibility functions v1 and v2, if
(i) W12  0,
(ii) the resistance to intertemporal substitution is greater than 1 ( W22W2  1),
(iii) v2 is more risk averse than v1,
(iv) v1 has constant or increasing relative risk aversion,
(v) v2 has constant or decreasing relative risk aversion, and
(vi) at least one condition in (ii) to (v) holds strictly,
then s1  s2.
Proof See Appendix. Q.E.D.
When W (x; y) = u(x) + U(y), W12 = 0 and  W22W2 =  U
00
U 0 . From Propositions 3.1 and 3.2,
we obtain
Proposition 3.3 Suppose two Selden/Kreps-Porteus utility functions share the same time ag-
gregator W (x; y) = u(x) + U(y) but have dierent inner interpossibility functions v1 and v2,
if
(i)  U 00U 0   
v001
v01
,
(ii) v2 is more risk averse than v1,
(iii) v02 is more risk averse than v01,
(iv) v2 has decreasing absolute risk aversion, and
(v) at least one condition in (i) to (iv) holds strictly,
then s1  s2.
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Proposition 3.4 Suppose two Selden/Kreps-Porteus utility functions share the same time ag-
gregator W (x; y) = u(x) + U(y) but have dierent inner interpossibility functions v1 and v2,
if
(i) the resistance to intertemporal substitution is greater than 1 ( U 00U 0  1),
(ii) v2 is more risk averse than v1,
(iii) v1 has constant or increasing relative risk aversion,
(iv) v2 has constant or decreasing relative risk aversion, and
(v) at least one condition in (i) to (iv) holds strictly,
then s1  s2.
For W (x; y) = u(x) + U(y), Kimball and Weil (2009, Propositions 5 and 6) examine how
aversion to risk aects the strength of the precautionary saving motive under the same aversion
to intertemporal substitution. Their study relies on the assumptions of DMUS and concavity of
u. Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 show that these two assumptions are redundant. Therefore Kimball
and Weil (2009, Propositions 5 and 6)'s conclusions can take care much more cases than we
thought.
4 Conclusion
This paper revisits the work of Gollier, Kimball and Weil on precautionary savings with general
Selden/Kreps-Porteus preferences. The main weakness of the existing results was that they
required a decreasing marginal utility of saving (DMUS)-an assumption for which various un-
appealing sucient conditions were derived, among which the unintuitive concavity of absolute
risk tolerance. We do away with DMUS and instead assume that the value function is super-
modular. Under that assumption, we show that the main comparative results of Kimball and
Weil (2009) on the eect of prudence and risk aversion on precautionary saving go through, with
supermodularity, without requiring DMUS. The study extends K-W-G's studies on precaution-
ary motives and improves our understanding of the determinants of precautionary savings. The
study also provides a new application for supermodularity in economics.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2
First we prove a lemma.
Suppose s1 > s2. From
V (s1; ~x) + V (s2; 0) > V (s1; 0) + V (s2; ~x) (4)
, W (w0   s1;M(s1; ~x)) +W (w0   s2;M(s2; 0))
> W (w0   s1;M(s1; 0)) +W (w0   s2;M(s2; ~x))
, W (w0   s1;M(s1; ~x)) W (w0   s1;M(s1; 0))
> W (w0   s2;M(s2; ~x)) W (w0   s2;M(s2; 0))
, W (w0   s;M(s; ~x)) W (w0   s;M(s; 0)) is increasing in s
, W1(w0   s;M(s; 0)) W1(w0   s;M(s; ~x))
+W2(w0   s;M(s; ~x))Ms(s; ~x)  W2(w0   s;M(s; 0)) > 0 (By M(s; 0) = w1 + s);
we know that
W1(w0   s;M(s; 0)) W1(w0   s;M(s; ~x)) (5)
and
W2(w0   s;M(s; ~x))Ms(s; ~x) > W2(w0   s;M(s; 0)) (6)
imply (4).
From
v(M(s; ~x)) = Ev(w1 + ~x+ s)  v(w1 + E~x+ s) = v(M(s; 0)); (7)
we obtain
M(s; ~x) M(s; 0): (8)
Therefore W12  0 implies (5).
From the assumption \v is strictly DARA", we obtain3
Ev(w1 + ~x+ s) = v(M(s; ~x))) Ev0(w1 + ~x+ s) > v0(M(s; ~x)): (9)
From v(M(s; ~x)) = Ev(w1 + ~x+ s), we have
Ms(s; ~x) = 
Ev0(w1 + ~x+ s)
v0(M(s; ~x))
: (10)
3See the inequality (20.14) in Gollier (2001).
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Therefore, both (9) and (10) imply
Ms(s; ~x) > : (11)
Finally, (8), (11) and W22  0 imply (6).
We summarize the above result in the following lemma4:
Lemma 5.1 When s1 > s2, W12  0, W22  0 and v is strictly DARA,
V (s1; ~x) + V (s2; 0) > V (s1; 0) + V (s2; ~x): (13)
Then we prove the main proposition via a contradiction:
Suppose s1 > s2. Since
s1 2 argmaxV (s; 0)) V (s1; 0)  V (s2; 0)  0; (14)
then W12  0, W22  0 and v is strictly DARA imply
V (s1; ~x)  V (s2; ~x) > V (s1; 0)  V (s2; 0) (by Lemma 5:1)
 0 (by(14)); (15)
and hence V (s1; ~x) > V (s2; ~x). This is a contradiction to s2 2 argmaxV (s; ~x), that is, s1  s2.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
First we prove a lemma.
Suppose s1 > s2. From
V2(s1; ~x) + V1(s2; ~x) > V1(s1; ~x) + V2(s2; ~x) (16)
, W (w0   s1;M2(s1; ~x)) +W (w0   s2;M1(s2; ~x)) > W (w0   s2;M2(s2; ~x)) +W (w0   s1;M1(s1; ~x))
, W (w0   s1;M2(s1; ~x)) W (w0   s1;M1(s1; ~x)) > W (w0   s2;M2(s2; ~x)) W (w0   s2;M1(s2; ~x))
, W (w0   s;M2(s; ~x)) W (w0   s;M1(s; ~x)) is increasing in s;
4(13) can be written as
V (a1; t2) + V (a2; t1) > V (a1; t1) + V (a2; t2); (12)
where a2  a1 and t1 dominates t2 in the sense of an increase in risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). Therefore,
V is strictly decreasing dierences and hence is strictly submodular (see e.g., Topkis 1998, p42-43). We can also
obtain Lemma 5.1 from a result in Topkis's Monotonicity Theorem (see e.g., Sundaram 1996, Theorem 10.6; or
Topkis 1998, Theorem 2.8.5; or Vives 2000, Theorem 2.3). Wang and Li (2014) provide an intuitive illustration
for this lemma via Eeckhoudt and Schlesingers (2006) harms disaggregation idea.
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we know
W1(w0   s;M1(s; ~x)) W1(w0   s;M2(s; ~x)) (17)
and
W2(w0   s;M2(s; ~x))M2s(s; ~x) > W2(w0   s;M1(s; ~x))M1s(s; ~x) (18)
imply (16)
Since \v2 is more risk averse than v1" implies M1(s; ~x)  M2(s; ~x), \v2 is more risk averse
than v1" together with W12  0 imply (17).
From a proof of Kimball and Weil (2009, p273-275), when we dene U(:) = W (w0   s; :),
we know that, if (i)  W22W2   
v001
v01
, (ii) v2 is more risk averse than v1, (iii) v
0
2 is more risk averse
than v01, and (iv) v2 has decreasing absolute risk aversion, then
W2(w0   s;M2(s; ~x))M2s(s; ~x) W2(w0   s;M1(s; ~x))M1s(s; ~x): (19)
If at least one condition in (i) to (iv) holds strictly, then
W2(w0   s;M2(s; ~x))M2s(s; ~x) > W2(w0   s;M1(s; ~x))M1s(s; ~x): (20)
Therefore, we can propose the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2 When s1 > s2 if
(i) W12  0,
(ii)  W22W2   
v001
v01
,
(iii) v2 is more risk averse than v1,
(iv) v02 is more risk averse than v01,
(v) v2 has decreasing absolute risk aversion, and
(vi) at least one condition in (ii) to (v) holds strictly,
then
V2(s1; ~x) + V1(s2; ~x) > V1(s1; ~x) + V2(s2; ~x): (21)
Then we prove the main proposition via a contradiction:
Suppose s1 > s2. Since
s1 2 argmaxV1(s; ~x)) V1(s1; ~x)  V1(s2; ~x)  0; (22)
then conditions (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) in Lemma 5.2 imply
V2(s1; ~x)  V2(s2; ~x) > V1(s1; ~x)  V1(s2; ~x) (by Lemma 5:2)
 0 (by(22)); (23)
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and hence V2(s1; ~x) > V2(s2; ~x). This is a contradiction to s2 2 argmaxV2(s; ~x), that is, s1  s2.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
From the proof of Proposition 3.1, we know that, when s1 > s2,
W1(w0   s;M1(s; ~x)) W1(w0   s;M2(s; ~x)) (24)
and
W2(w0   s;M2(s; ~x))M2s(s; ~x) > W2(w0   s;M1(s; ~x))M1s(s; ~x) (25)
imply
V2(s1; ~x) + V1(s2; ~x) > V1(s1; ~x) + V2(s2; ~x): (26)
Again, \v2 is more risk averse than v1" together with W12  0 imply (24).
From a proof of Kimball and Weil (2009, p275-276), we know that, if (i) the resistance to
intertemporal substitution is greater than 1 ( W22W2  1), (ii) v2 is more risk averse than v1,
(iii) v1 has constant or increasing relative risk aversion, and (iv) v2 has constant or decreasing
relative risk aversion, then
W2(w0   s;M2(s; ~x))M2s(s; ~x) W2(w0   s;M1(s; ~x))M1s(s; ~x): (27)
If at least one condition in (i) to (iv) holds strictly, then
W2(w0   s;M2(s; ~x))M2s(s; ~x) > W2(w0   s;M1(s; ~x))M1s(s; ~x): (28)
Therefore, we can propose the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3 When s1 > s2, if
(i) W12  0,
(ii) the resistance to intertemporal substitution is greater than 1 ,
(iii) v2 is more risk averse than v1,
(iv) v1 has constant or increasing relative risk aversion,
(v) v2 has constant or decreasing relative risk aversion, and
(vi) at least one condition in (ii) to (v) holds strictly,
then
V2(s1; ~x) + V1(s2; ~x) > V1(s1; ~x) + V2(s2; ~x): (29)
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Then we prove the main proposition via a contradiction:
Suppose s1 > s2. Since
s1 2 argmaxV1(s; ~x)) V1(s1; ~x)  V1(s2; ~x)  0; (30)
then conditions (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) in Lemma 5.3 imply
V2(s1; ~x)  V2(s2; ~x) > V1(s1; ~x)  V1(s2; ~x) (by Lemma 5:3)
 0 (by(30)); (31)
and hence V2(s1; ~x) > V2(s2; ~x). This is a contradiction to s2 2 argmaxV2(s; ~x), that is, s1  s2.
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